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Office Space Supply Restrictions in Britain: 
The Political Economy of Market Revenge 
 
 
Abstract 
Office space in Britain is the most expensive in the world. Even in a struggling, 
medium sized city, like Birmingham, costs are more than 40 percent higher than in 
Manhattan although construction costs half as much. Taken together with research 
showing a significant negative net welfare effect of planning constraints in the 
residential sector, regulatory constraints are the obvious explanation. To investigate 
this we first explore the meaning of Glaeser et al’s (2005) Regulatory Tax (RT) and 
then estimate values for 14 British office locations. Even on the most conservative 
assumptions this shows a very substantial cost of regulation in Britain - orders of 
magnitude greater than estimates for Manhattan condominiums. Having values going 
back more than 40 years allows us to investigate the political economy of the 
regulatory restrictions. Britain has a fiscal disincentive for communities to permit 
commercial development since business rates are a national tax. In all but two 
locations, residents control development and their main incentive to allow 
development is unemployment. The useful exceptions are the City of London and 
Docklands, controlled by business interests, and, in the City’s case, with a unique 
fiscal incentive to allow development. The City is also the only office location in 
Britain where the RT value has fallen over time, seemingly related to an explicit 
loosening of planning restrictiveness in the 1980s triggered by competition from other 
locations. Exploiting the cross sectional panel data allows us to test these hypotheses 
and the results provide strong support. 
 
 
JEL classification: H3, J6, Q15, R52. 
Keywords: Land use regulation, regulatory costs, business taxation, office markets.
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1 Introduction: The Problem in an International Perspective1 
 
The cost of constructing a m2 of office space in Birmingham, England, in 2004 was 
approximately half that in Manhattan2. This is not very surprising since Birmingham 
is a struggling, medium sized city on the flat plains of the British Midlands and 
Manhattan is big, topographically constrained, prosperous and highly dynamic. If we 
were looking for an American equivalent to Birmingham, maybe, St Louis, Missouri 
would pop up. When we couple the cost of construction with the costs of occupation 
of that same m2, however, we do get a shock. In the same year the total occupation 
costs per m2 were 44 percent higher in Birmingham than they were in Manhattan 
(KingSturge, 2004).  Something very odd must be going on. The obvious anomaly is 
the intensity and restrictiveness of land use controls in the UK and this paper sets out 
to investigate the economic costs of these restrictions and what drives them. 
 
In the past few years US urban economists have become interested in the analysis of 
land use regulation and concerned about increasing regulatory restrictions influencing 
the supply and costs of housing3 and perhaps sorting between cities4.  Glaeser et al 
(2005) for example conclude that regulatory restrictions increase housing prices in the 
most tightly constrained metro areas by some 50 percent and by considerably more in 
Manhattan. This is potentially of concern because not only is the effective tax 
substantial but it has been rising over time. However, no researcher has yet reported a 
significant effect of regulatory constraint on the costs of commercial space in the US. 
This is no great surprise given the fiscal incentives to local communities to allow 
commercial development. 
 
The situation in the UK, however, is several orders of magnitudes more restricted. 
This is partly because land use regulation in the UK takes the form of universal 
growth constraints: and growth constraints applied not just to the total area of urban 
land take for each city but individually to each category of land use within each city. 
So urban ‘envelopes’ are fixed by growth boundaries but within these envelopes the 
area of land available for retail, offices, warehouses and industry is all tightly 
controlled. Although not entirely inflexible, Greenbelts surrounding cities have been 
more or less sacrosanct since they were established, out of town retail is effectively 
prohibited5, and local planning authorities have been extremely reluctant to expand 
the area of commercial space. There are, moreover, a raft of preservation designations 
                                                 
1
 We thank Robin Goodchild and Colin Lizieri for helpful comments and suggestions. We are grateful 
to Robin Goodchild from LaSalle Investment Management, Peter Damesick from UK CB Richard Ellis 
and Simon Rawlinson from Davis Langdon for kindly providing data. Gerard Dericks provided 
excellent research assistance. The remaining errors are the sole responsibility of the authors. 
2
 This uses the ratio of Birmingham office construction costs to those in London from Davis Langdon 
(see Section 3 of this paper), the ratio of Davis and Langdon’s London construction cost estimates to 
those from Gardiner and Theobald to apply to Gardiner and Theobald’s construction cost data for New 
York offices to estimate figures on a comparable basis for both Birmingham and New York. 
3
 See, for example, Brueckner (2000); Evenson and Wheaton (2003); Glaeser and Gyourko (2003); 
Glaeser et al (2005); Mayer and Somerville (2000); Mayo and Sheppard (2001); Phillips and Goodstein 
(2000); or Song and Knaap (2003). 
4
 See Gyouko et al (2005). 
5
 On two different grounds: to maintain the economic strength of city centres and to reduce car use. 
Whether either objective is actually served by this policy and, in so far as it is, at what cost – is unclear. 
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and height controls on buildings. The present pattern of regulation was essentially set 
in aspic in 1947 so has been in place for two generations. 
 
Any reluctance of local communities to allow expansion of commercial space may be 
at least significantly explained by the fact that they have strong tax incentives not to. 
Taxes on commercial real estate (the business rate) accrue to national not local 
government (and account for some 5 percent of national tax revenues) but local 
authorities have to provide services to commercial property. The only interesting (and 
for us useful) exception is the City of London which, when the ‘Uniform Business 
Rate’ (UBR) was introduced in 1989, was granted a unique exception and allowed to 
retain 15 percent of revenues raised. In addition to the property tax implications, there 
are other costs to local voters associated with development. Together, these generate 
very strong NIMBY pressures. As the retiring political head of the planning authority 
for one of the office locations analysed in this paper said when asked what had been 
his major achievement in office:  
[our main achievement was that] “…not a single new major office development 
has been approved. We managed to keep development down.” (Reading 
Chronicle, 1989).  
As we argue below, with the important and helpful exceptions of the City of London 
and London Docklands, the only incentive for local communities to permit 
commercial real estate development is local voters’ fears of unemployment. 
A further factor is that constraints and growth controls in the UK have been being 
applied since 1947. The nearest equivalent form of regulation in the USA, in Portland 
Oregon, still much less restrictive than applies in the UK, has been in force only since 
1973 - not much more than half that time. Because regulatory constraints only affect 
new construction (at least directly – as we see in the UK they produce strong 
incentives, if tight enough, to induce conversion of older stock to multi-occupation on 
a large scale) they influence real estate prices with a significant lag. As was noted in 
Cheshire and Sheppard (2004) their impact on housing prices only began to be 
observable from about ten years after they were introduced, that is from 1955 or so. 
The result is that the economic effects of land use regulation are orders of magnitude 
greater in the UK than they are in the US. Using data for 1984 and using quite 
conservative assumptions, Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) estimated that the net 
welfare costs6 of restrictions on land supply in a prosperous community in southern 
England, Reading, were equivalent to nearly 4 percent as an annual income tax. In 
2003, at the outer boundary of permitted development in Reading, housing land was 
some £3,000,000 per hectare (Cheshire and Sheppard, 2005). A few feet away 
agricultural land, not within the urban envelope, was worth perhaps £7,500 per 
hectare. As Muellbauer (2005) commented, such price distortions are ‘grotesque’. The 
constraints on the housing market have become so significant that the British Treasury 
and the Department of Communities and Local Government (formerly the Office of 
the Deputy Prime Minister) have now commissioned two separate enquiries (Barker, 
2003; 2004 and 2006). 
                                                 
6
 Net in the strict sense that benefits were also quantified and so the measure was the excess value of 
total costs over benefits measured in terms of equivalent income variation. 
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Office space in London, according to commercial data (KingSturge, 2003 to 2005) is 
not just more expensive than anywhere else in the world; it is some three times as 
expensive as the next most expensive city in Europe, Paris, and more than three times 
as expensive as in Manhattan. Even more telling, perhaps, are the costs of office space 
in British provincial cities. Birmingham was the next most expensive European city 
after Paris, and Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester were all more expensive than 
Manhattan; office space costs almost twice as much in any of those smaller and not 
very prosperous British cities as it does in San Francisco – a city which not only is 
highly prosperous and has some of the tightest regulatory constraints on housing in 
the US but also has topographical constraints on land supply. Office space in 
Birmingham cost 124 percent more than in fast growing, twice as big and land 
strapped Singapore. 
The story in the retail sector seems to be even more extreme. The most important 
determinants of land prices in a city, in the absence of regulatory restrictions, will be 
the size of the city and its income level. Other factors, such as differences in expected 
rates of urban growth, topography and transport systems, may also play a part, as will 
environmental qualities or the quality of local public goods such as schools and 
security (see, for example, Gyourko and Tracey, 1991). So if we want to find a 
worthwhile indicator of the role of regulatory restrictions we should try to standardise 
for such differences. Cheshire and Sheppard (1986) provided evidence on land prices 
in US comparator cities, matched as closely as possible with UK cities (Reading and 
Darlington) for all except environmental and local public goods. Land prices for all 
use classes (except industry in deindustrialising Darlington) were orders of magnitude 
higher in the two UK cities. The most extreme case was the most expensive retail land 
in the prosperous UK city (Reading) compared to its US counterpart (Stockton, CA). 
In Reading the most sought after land available for retail use cost almost 250 times as 
much per acre as its equivalent in Stockton. 
To date there has been rigorous quantification of the economic effects of land use 
constraints on the UK housing sector but not for any category of commercial property, 
although concerns in government departments with economic responsibilities have 
now reached the point that a new investigation into their effects on the supply of 
commercial space has been launched (Barker, 2006). The purpose of this paper is to 
begin to address this gap in our knowledge and investigate the costs of land use 
regulation for commercial property in the UK in a rather more rigorous way than the 
broad comparisons of rents and occupation costs provided by real estate 
intermediaries.  
An obvious problem in analysing the economic impacts of land use planning is 
identifying exactly what element in total occupation costs – the cost of space to 
economic agents - may reasonably be attributed to ‘planning’ restrictions. This is 
because i) such restrictions take many forms over and beyond restricting the supply of 
land or space; and ii) it is difficult to offset for the normal factors such as city size etc, 
that urban economic theory tells one should be expected to influence the price of land 
and space.  Furthermore, if we want to estimate the economic impact of any measured 
increase in space costs resulting from regulation, we would need to go a second step – 
not included in this research. We should estimate the impact on output, employment 
and incomes generated by the increase in space costs produced by regulatory 
constraints. Then offset those costs against any benefits regulation produced. 
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In the context of the residential sector, an elaborate and theoretically rigorous 
methodology was set out in Cheshire and Sheppard (2002) for estimating both the 
gross and the net costs of regulatory restrictions on the supply of residential land and 
so the net welfare cost these had. The methodology involved estimating implicit 
prices for housing and garden space and planning produced amenities; then by 
matching these to a household income survey, estimating both the structure of demand 
for these housing and planning ‘goods’ and the indirect utility function of households. 
If it was assumed that urban housing markets were in equilibrium (for which there 
was reasonable empirical evidence) these could be combined to estimate the de facto 
supply of space released by the planning system within the housing market concerned 
(Reading) since equilibrium requires that all available space be consumed. It was then 
possible to estimate via the indirect utility function and estimated demand system, the 
impact on welfare, in terms of equivalent variation in incomes, of changes in the 
supply of both planning amenities and housing space consequent on a more - or less - 
restrictive supply of urban space and consequent supply of planning amenities. 
Because the analysis built up from observations of individual households it was also 
possible to estimate the distributional consequences of land supply restrictions and the 
trade off of planning produced amenities for private space.   
 
This, however, is demanding on data and research time and depends on being able to 
explicitly identify and estimate the economic impacts of the goods/amenities 
generated by planning, the impact of regulation on supply and the indirect utility 
functions of residents/citizens. Even if it were not so data intensive, it is not clear such 
a methodology could be adapted to estimating the economic and welfare impacts of 
regulation of the supply of non-residential property because of the difficulty - perhaps 
impossibility - of estimating the relevant production function.  
 
We estimate here, just the first of these elements: a measure of the total cost of 
regulatory constraints on the price of office space expressed as a ‘tax’ – that is as a 
percentage of construction costs. To do this we adapt the methodology first developed 
and applied to the Manhattan condominium market by Glaeser et al (2005). The value 
of this measure and its interpretation is the subject of section 2 of this paper. The 
Glaeser et al (2005) methodology has the considerable attraction that it is 
intellectually coherent, resting on established microeconomic theory, and it is not 
demanding with respect to data and estimation techniques. It can be applied to any 
category of space so long as a unit of space in an additional story is a more or less 
perfect substitute for an additional unit of space obtained via a larger building 
footprint. Thus, it can be applied to offices or hotels, as well as high rise blocks of 
flats, but more doubtfully to industrial, retail or warehouse space. Its downside is that 
it is a ‘black box’ number in that it does not differentiate between costs that are 
imposed by different aspects of regulation. Rather it is an aggregate measure of the 
gross cost of regulatory constraints limiting the height of buildings and – more 
indirectly – the supply of land for the use in question. So it reflects the costs of 
restrictions on land supply, space by floor area ratios or height restrictions, or 
common forms of conservation designation. It is far less plausible to argue that it 
captures costs imposed by compliance complexity or delays in decision making. In 
addition, it only gives a ‘cost’ not a net welfare or net impact on output measure. As 
is well known, there are measurable benefits from some aspects of regulation and, 
since space is substitutable to a degree both in production and consumption, the 
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effects on output or welfare can only be estimated if both the benefits and the extent 
of substitutability are known. So the regulatory tax estimates are a lower bound 
estimate of a gross cost of land use regulation in any location. 
 
Glaeser et al (2005) report their results for Manhattan apartments as a price to 
construction cost ratio (rather than as a quasi-tax rate; regulatory tax to construction 
cost). For the most recent year they had data for, 2002, this ratio was 2.07. In our tax-
rate measure, this would translate to a value of 1.07. They also investigated other data 
which suggested that the value of the regulatory tax on housing was higher in some 
West Coast urban areas, such as the Bay Area and Los Angeles, than it was in the 
New York urban area as a whole (it was much higher in Manhattan itself than it was 
in the New York metro area) although it was still substantial in the New York area. 
However, in 10 of the 21 urban areas investigated there was no measurable impact of 
regulation on house prices. Nor was there any indication of a ‘regulatory tax’ on 
office property in Manhattan.  This provides some standard against which to evaluate 
the results for office property in the British cities reported below. 
 
2 An Interpretation of the Regulatory Tax (RT) as a Measure of the  
Costs of Restrictions 
 
The key idea of the Regulatory Tax (RT) approach is simple; in a world with 
competition among property developers and free market entry and exit (both 
reasonable assumptions), price will equal (minimum) average cost since this includes 
‘normal’ profit. Marginal cost rises with building height so in the absence of 
restrictions on heights, buildings should rise to a point where the marginal cost of 
adding an additional floor equals its market price. If building higher is less profitable 
per m2 than building over a greater area, still we should expect the marginal cost of an 
extra floor to be equal to price: buildings would just be lower on average but the 
overall urban land take would be greater. Bertaud and Brueckner (2005) demonstrate 
the formal equivalence of height restrictions compared to land supply restrictions. The 
gap between the observed market price and the marginal construction cost can be 
interpreted, therefore, as a ‘regulatory tax’ – the additional cost of space resulting – in 
aggregate – from the system of regulation in that particular market. If the sales price 
of an additional floor of office space exceeded the marginal cost of building this 
additional floor then developers would have an arbitrage opportunity. The difference 
between the price of floor space and its cost of construction must be due to some form 
of regulation.  
 
This is illustrated in Figure 1 which depicts the cost curves of representative 
competitive developers in (by assumption) two unregulated markets; one relatively 
prosperous and ‘attractive’ office market, say, London (L) and one less prosperous 
and ‘attractive’ market, say, Birmingham (B). For illustrative convenience we assume 
that the marginal (construction) cost curve is identical in both markets implying that 
wages, materials and other variable costs do not vary regionally. We also assume – 
quite reasonably – and that buildings of a given type have an optimal floor plan to 
height ratio (given the price of land).  
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Figure 1: A Developer’s Cost Curves without Space Restrictions 
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In a competitive market P=MC=AC and is given. The demand curve that the firm 
faces is flat. The regulatory tax RT is P-MC=0 in both cases.  
 
In Figure 2 we illustrate the economic rent of land for the two markets. 
 
Figure 2: Land Rent 
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Figure 2 additionally depicts the average variable cost curve, AVC, which covers all 
inputs except land. The average cost curves, AC, additionally include the costs of the 
fixed factor, land. The differences between the price and the average variable costs at 
the optimal building height can be interpreted as land rents (subject to site preparation 
and infrastructure costs). The illustrated cost curves imply that building heights will 
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be higher and so MC will be also higher in London. Underlying ‘pure’ land values are 
relevant in the sense that, given different input costs, the optimal capital to land ratio 
will be different in different markets. The land rent is greater for London than for 
Birmingham so buildings are higher but the difference in land rents between the two 
markets does not affect the value of the RT. In the absence of restrictions, RT will be 
zero. 
 
We can think about this in more detail by considering two cases. Case F is the 
unregulated situation while Case R is the regulated one.  
 
Case F: Suppose we have an unregulated world with a competitive development and 
office market and the cost of an additional floor rises with building height: then 
building heights rise until, per m2 Marginal Cost of Construction (MC)=Marginal 
Revenue(MR)=Average Cost of Construction (AC)=Price(P)=Average Revenue 
(AR). In such a market, therefore, the price per m2 includes all costs for a given 
building; construction + land + normal profit. Suppose we then add a hypothetical 
additional floor. The MC per m2 is higher for this additional floor than for the existing 
highest floor but price is not (or not perceptibly). The ‘land’ is already paid for in the 
existing building, part of fixed costs and included in AC. There is, then, no 
appreciable RT.  
 
Now consider the regulated world of Case R in which there is a supply constraint on 
building heights. We have an existing building and a competitive development and 
office market, but it is no longer true that building heights rise to the point at which 
MC=MR. They could profitably be higher but this profit is capitalised into the price 
paid for land so profits are still ‘normal’. Land is a fixed cost included, therefore, in 
average costs. If we now add a hypothetical floor to an existing building there is no 
extra land cost – these are already ‘paid for’ in the existing building and included in 
AC. The marginal cost is only the extra construction cost but the price reflects the 
constrained supply, now without land rents having to be paid for, so price exceeds 
MC and the difference represents the gross cost of regulation - or the RT. This is 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: A Developer’s Cost Curves with Height Restrictions (London only) 
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In essence Case F and Case R are identical and land is eliminated from the RT 
measure because it is already paid for in the existing building. The fact that the price 
of the extra space in Case R is higher has nothing to do with paying for the land but 
reflects the constraint, including scarcity of space. Although the RT measure 
eliminates the impact of land costs in the current regulated market conditions IF the 
market were unregulated land costs per m2 would be lower: so the observed MC in a 
regulated market are unlikely to be the same as they would be in an unregulated 
market. 
 
However, not all regulatory constraints are as simple as height restrictions. There may 
be cases where the specific form of the regulations influences the costs of construction 
and the shape of the cost curves. Take an extreme example of hypothetical land use 
regulations. Suppose there were no controls on building heights but rigid controls on 
the amount of land made available for (office) construction and rigid constraints on 
the size of the floor plan relative to the size of the site. In such a situation there would 
still be a market demand for total office space and building heights would still rise 
until the point at which MC=AC=P. So estimated RT would be zero.  
 
This would not mean, however that the regulatory system imposed no costs. Since 
costs per floor rise with the number of floors, to get a given total quantity of space, 
buildings would have to be much higher so the AC and MC curves would, in effect, 
be shifted to the left and upwards. To provide 36,000 m2 of space (a large office 
building) with a floor plan of 1,200 m2 would imply a 30 storey building and so a 
height of, say, 100 metres: to get the same space if the restriction allowed only 25m2 
per floor would imply 1,440 stories – a building some 4.75 kilometres high. 
 
Now consider another extreme of hypothetical regulation: suppose that there are no 
constraints on building or land availability at all, but stringent compliances costs 
related to, say, permits, but such costs are a function only of individual buildings. 
Once the compliance process has been completed, the agreed building can be 
constructed with no further compliance costs at all. In such a case the costs of 
compliance will appear as a fixed cost and, if the results related to the incidence of 
Impact Fees are applicable (Ihlanfeldt and Shaughnessy, 2004) will be fully 
Research Papers in Environmental and Spatial Analysis No. 117 
 
11 
capitalised into land prices. Thus, there could be no impact on marginal costs or on 
the price of space. There will be a deadweight loss, but this loss will fall uniquely on 
the price of land although given that the profitability of transferring land from 
agricultural to urban use will be reduced it could reduce the overall supply of urban 
land and so have some affect on space costs. 
 
What these examples suggest is that the relationship between measured RT and the 
actual gross costs of regulation (if these could be measured exactly) is, in principle, a 
variable one and will depend on the precise form the regulatory constraints take. So 
long as at least an element of the regulatory constraints takes the form of restrictions 
on the height of buildings, however, for those types of uses in which vertical space is 
a more or less perfect substitute for horizontal space, the measured RT will be 
strongly and positively correlated with the actual gross costs of regulatory constraints. 
The RT measure will, however, be a lower bound estimate of the gross costs because, 
for example, some of the regulatory constraints may relate to compliance costs or 
costs of delay. 
 
Need this concern us particularly in the case of British offices? Restrictions on 
building heights take several forms but are applied in all British markets. In the City 
of London, for example, no less than eight separate ‘view corridors’ of St Paul’s 
cathedral (both foreground and background) are protected from building above some 
55 metres and five ‘view corridors’ of the Monument are similarly protected as are 
four street blocks around the Monument (City of London, 1991). There are, in 
addition, extensive ‘Conservation Areas’ within which very limited changes to the 
external appearance of buildings is possible – obviously including height - and, 
throughout the City – as in all British cities – there are floor area ratio restrictions, 
known in the UK as ‘plot ratios’. These are set at 5.1:1 in the City (City of London, 
1991, para. 16.42). There are, in addition, other regulations affecting the design of 
buildings which limit height and space within them. Planning policies in London’s 
West End are substantially more restrictive than those in the City, since very large 
areas – most of Mayfair and Belgravia – are designated Conservation Areas where it 
is not possible to build higher than the existing structure, where external, and if the 
buildings are listed (which many are) even internal, alterations are prohibited7. Such 
historic conservation regulations undoubtedly generate amenity values, not included 
in a measure of RT.  
  
In summary, then, the RT measure of the gross costs of regulatory constraints on 
buildings is something of a black box in that it will incorporate the cost of restrictions 
on the supply of land for the use in question and restrictions on building heights. 
These may arise from various sources but are imposed in all our office locations with 
at least ‘plot ratio’ controls (floor area ratios in the US). Since land use planning is a 
national system in the UK it seems likely that compliance costs and costs of delay do 
not vary significantly across locations but such costs will not be fully captured in the 
RT measure and may not be captured at all. So we can conclude that estimated RT 
                                                 
7
 An interesting outcome in the very high end of the residential market in London’s West End is a very 
restricted supply of large floor plan flats. Listed building designation is applied even to internal 
connecting doors between adjoining structures so it is impossible to construct flats with larger floor 
plans than existing 18th and 19th Century structures. The result is a large premium per square metre for 
the few large floor plan flats available. 
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values will be strongly and positively correlated with actual gross costs of regulatory 
constraints but in absolute terms are likely to be lower bound estimates. 
 
3  Data 
 
In order to estimate regulatory tax values we need ‘price’ and ‘marginal construction 
cost’ data. Our empirical analysis builds on the best available data for the British 
office market and a number of continental European cities. After careful and detailed 
discussion to agree how best to measure marginal costs of construction (i.e., the 
estimated cost of adding an additional hypothetical floor to an existing building) 
Davis Langdon estimated time-series data for the agreed definitions by market (per 
square foot or square metre). Davis Langdon are the leading UK producers of 
construction cost data for the building industry and produce the Spon Handbooks used 
by quantity surveyors and architects (Davis Langdon 2005). See Appendix A for a 
detailed description of the methodology Davis Langdon used to derive the marginal 
cost of construction. Gardiner and Theobald (2006) – Davis Langdon’s major 
competitor – provides (average) construction cost data for our sample of continental 
European cities. Unfortunately, comparable time-series data on the market price of 
office space in the sense of capital values is not readily available, only data on rents, 
yields and rent free periods can be obtained. CB Richard Ellis, CBRE, the largest 
property consultancy in the UK, provided the relevant data for British markets. 
Similar data (although estimated on a different basis) were also provided by Jones 
Lang LaSalle (JLL) for a number of our British locations and all the continental 
European ones we report estimates for. We used the common British locations to 
make the best adjustment we can to a common basis.  
 
Only rental not capital values are available because office buildings are treated as 
income producing assets that are typically leased (rather than sold) floor by floor. 
Given this complication, we need to impute the market price of an additional floor of 
office space (the ‘capitalised value’) using the available information on rents, yields, 
rent-free periods and vacancy rates. The estimation procedure is briefly described 
below and explained in more detail in Appendices B to D. Since we do not observe 
transaction prices but must rely on estimates, we carry out a quite extensive sensitivity 
analysis using the most ‘conservative’ and ‘radical’ assumptions which are defensible. 
These provide an upper and a lower bound estimate, in addition to a central, perhaps 
most plausible, value. Finally we provide some more tentative estimates for the 
regulatory tax imposed on office space in some continental European cities for which 
there are data from JLL and Gardiner and Theobald. 
 
Our data for the RT estimates for British office locations come from four different 
sources. CBRE (which incorporates the former CB Hillier Parker and before that 
Hillier Parker, the first agency to publish rental and yield data including the Investors 
Chronicle Hillier Parker reports) provided us with (headline) prime rents and 
equivalent yield and rent-free period data for 14 local office markets in the UK (see 
Table 1 for a list of the markets). Both time-series cover all 14 local markets. Most 
time-series go back to 1973 with two series (those for the City of London and London 
West End) reaching back to 1960. CBRE also provided us with total occupation cost 
data, although only for 2004 and 2005 and for 8 of the 14 relevant markets. We 
obtained the matching marginal construction cost data for all 14 markets from Davis 
Langdon, based on actual construction projects in those markets also going back to 
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1960. Finally, we obtained regional vacancy rate information from the Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) and national rental void data from IPD.  
 
The data for the RT estimates for European office locations comes from two 
additional sources. JLL provided us with prime rent and equivalent yield data from 
1990 to 2005 (continental European cities) and for 1987 to 2005 (British cities). These 
allow us to compute hypothetical capital values (so called ‘Peter Pan values’) based 
on the assumption that the buildings are permanently renewed. Unfortunately, JLL 
does not provide us with information on voids or vacancies, so we use the ratio of the 
CBRE to JLL estimated values where we have common locations (for six British 
locations) to obtain as comparable a set of capital values for all locations, British and 
continental European. Gardiner and Theobald’s (2006) ‘International Construction 
Cost Survey’ provides average construction cost data back until 1999 so we can 
estimate RT values from 1999 to 2005. We use the ratio of marginal to average costs 
from Davis Langdon and Gardiner and Theobald to estimate the hypothetical marginal 
cost of construction for the continental European office locations. More detail is given 
in Appendix E. 
 
Imputing Missing Values 
Our raw data come in different time-intervals. The prime rent data, for example, are 
quarterly for the City of London and London’s West End back to 1960; however, they 
are quarterly, monthly, half-annually and annually for the other 12 markets (with the 
exception of three markets back to 1973). Similarly, the yield data come in various 
time intervals. The construction cost data are annual. Hence, in order to make our data 
comparable, we use annual numbers when available and compute annual numbers 
(averages from the available monthly, quarterly or half-annual data) when not. 
 
Even though we use annualised data we still have missing values for a number of 
variables and markets. For example, we only obtained rent-free period data for two 
markets (the City of London and London’s West End) and only between 1993 and 
2006. For the remaining years and other markets we need to impute the rent-free 
periods using the available data (see Appendix B for details). Similarly, we need to 
impute equivalent yields prior to 1973 using the available data. The methodology is 
described in Appendix C. The imputed values obviously introduce an additional 
degree of uncertainty into estimates prior to 1972 (1972 Hillier Parker yields were 
available and these are believed to be comparable to the CBRE data series). We also 
have to impute vacancy rates from relatively short time-series of regional data from 
ODPM and longer time-series data from IPD. The methodology is described in more 
detail in Appendix D. Imputing values of yields could, we believe, have a significant 
impact on the final estimates of RT. So we should be very cautious with respect to any 
interpretation of estimated values of the regulatory tax or trends in that tax prior to 
1972. The absolute differences to estimates resulting from any plausible alternative 
values of rent free periods and vacancy rates are, however, comparatively small. We 
are confident, therefore, that while the need to impute values for such data is not 
entirely satisfactory, the additional margin of error it may introduce into the estimates 
is small in absolute terms. 
 
We have to impute missing rental values using national rent-index data from Hillier 
Parker (today CBRE). The Hillier Parker ICHP national rent-index data is available 
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back to 1965 but only for three years. This does allow us to impute missing rental 
values between 1965 and 1972 but for missing years we assume a linear trend.  
 
Finally, we impute total occupation cost by assuming a constant scaling factor to fully 
adjusted prime rents using the ratio: average of the total occupation cost for each 
market 2004 and 2005 divided by fully adjusted prime rent. We can match prime rent 
and total occupation costs for 8 of the 14 markets. For the remaining 6 markets we 
assume the ratio of the geographically closest market for which data are available. 
 
4 Methodology Used to Compute the Regulatory Tax (RT) 
 
Our goal is to estimate, as accurately as possible, the magnitude of the RT over time 
for the 14 local office markets. The RT can be expressed as: 
 
jt jt jtRT = V  - MCC  (1) 
 
where Vjt is the market value of an additional square metre of office space in market j 
at time period t and where MCCjt is the corresponding marginal construction cost of 
adding one square metre of an additional floor. 
 
The computation of the two components Vjt and MCCjt is described below. 
 
The market value of a square metre of additional office space is estimated using the 
‘Equivalent Yield Model’, which is probably the most commonly used model to value 
income producing property in Britain.8 According to the equivalent yield model, the 
property value can be expressed as: 
 
( )1
jt jt jt
jt
jt jt jt
jt n
I R I
V
y y y
−
= +
+
 (2) 
where jtV  is the value of the property (in location j at time period t), jty  is the 
corresponding equivalent yield, jtR  is the so called ‘current rental value’, jtI  is the 
‘passing income’ and jtn  is the number of years to the next rent review.  
 
The equivalent yield is equal to the internal rate of return (IRR) of two cash flow 
streams (a stream of ‘passing incomes’ up to the rent review and then a stream of 
current rental values, assumed to be constant (in real terms) in perpetuity). The 
‘passing income’ (which is expressed in nominal terms) only includes the rents that 
the tenants ‘pass’ on to their landlord. Tenants that are still in their rent-free period or 
non-rented space do not contribute to the passing income. Hence, in order to get from 
the (headline) prime rent to the passing income, adjustments for rent-free periods and 
vacancies have to be made as follows: 
 
                                                 
8
  See for example Brown and Matysiak (2000) for a more detailed discussion of the ‘Equivalent 
Yield Model’. 
 
Research Papers in Environmental and Spatial Analysis No. 117 
 
15 
1 1jt jtjt jt
Rent Free Period Vacancy Rate in %
I Prime Rent
Typical Contract Length 100
   
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   
. (3) 
 
The ‘current rental value’ is measured in real terms and is assumed to remain constant 
in perpetuity. The capitalised value of the current rental value reflects the reversion 
value at the time when the current lease expires. 
 
If we make the reasonable assumption that the current rental value (in real terms) 
equals the passing income, then the property value can be expressed as 
 
jt
jt
jt
I
V
y
= . (4) 
 
Using equation (3), the estimated value can finally be expressed as: 
 
Rent Free Period Vacancy Rate in %
Prime Rent 1 1
Typical Contract Length 100
jt jt
jt
jt
jt
V
y
   
× − × −   
   
= . (4.1) 
The main advantage of using the equivalent yield model to estimate the capitalised 
value of office space is that it requires estimates of only two unknown variables, 
namely, an estimate of the passing income and the equivalent yield. The equivalent 
yield can be estimated from comparable properties in the local market place that have 
recently been sold (i.e., it can be derived through ‘reverse engineering’ using 
transaction prices and rental income information).  
 
Although the equivalent yield model is simplistic and obviously has a number of 
serious economic shortcomings, it provides surprisingly accurate valuations. This is 
probably for some combination of two reasons: First, professional valuers9 are 
familiar with subtle changes in the market that will influence the choice of yield; and 
second, valuers’ valuations – based on the equivalent yield model – are the basis for 
transactions (‘deals’). Hence, even if a valuation does not reflect the ‘true value’ of a 
property (reflecting all future cash flows discounted at the ‘correct’ rate), as long as 
buyers and sellers use the same valuation model, they will end up agreeing on a 
(transaction) price that reflects the model’s predicted value. 
 
As discussed above we commissioned Davis Langdon to get the best possible estimate 
of the true marginal construction cost of adding an additional floor, with a time series 
going back to 1960. The estimating method is described in more detail in Appendix 
A. 
 
The RT is computed as the estimated market value per square metre (fully adjusted 
for rent-free periods and vacancy rates) minus the marginal construction cost data 
provided by Davis Langdon. Rather than reporting the regulatory tax directly, we 
report a quasi-tax rate, the regulatory tax relative to marginal construction cost: 
 
                                                 
9
 'Appraisers' in the US. 
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1jt jt jt jtjt
jt jt jt
RT V MCC V
RT Rate
MCC MCC MCC
−
= = = − . (5) 
 
These regulatory tax rates are reported for all 14 markets and for all time periods with 
available data (see Figures F1-F4). 
 
Given that the RT is not directly observed but must be estimated making various 
assumptions, it is sensible to carry out a robustness check of results altering the 
underlying assumptions: specifically, we estimated regulatory tax values for three 
different sets of assumptions. The alternative sets of assumptions are as follows: 
 
1. Upper Bound: Assume that 50% of the difference between total occupation cost 
and prime rent is due to a regulatory tax and assume a 10% rent-premium for top 
floor space. 
2. Use the fully adjusted prime rent as the basis (as in the central estimate) but 
assume a 10% premium for top floors. 
3. Lower Bound: Use the fully adjusted prime rent as the basis (as in the central 
estimate) but assume a 0.5 percentage point higher yield than reported by CBRE. 
 
5 Results and their Interpretation 
 
The results are summarised in Tables 1 to 3. Table 1 shows the markets investigated. 
Table 2 illustrates the sensitivity of the results to alternative assumptions (as outlined 
above); and Table 3 reports the mean value of the ‘regulatory tax’ and other 
descriptive statistics for each year from 1961 to 2005.  The markets were selected to 
cover as wide and representative a range as possible including the main office 
locations in Scotland. 
 
It is clear from Table 2 that there are no realistic assumptions which eliminate a 
substantial regulatory tax. The mean value, at 2.37, even for the most conservative 
lower bound estimate, is more than twice that estimated for Manhattan housing by 
Glaeser et al (2005). 
 
Table 3 shows the annual mean values. We should largely discount values before 
1973 since these are i) weighted to the two London markets; and ii) we are uncertain 
as to the reliability of the estimated yields prior to 1972. 
 
It is immediately clear that the estimated size of the regulatory tax moves with the real 
estate cycle. This is because real estate prices are substantially more cyclically volatile 
than are construction costs although, of course, one effect of regulatory restrictions 
would be to constrain supply and so reduce its elasticity in the upswing and increase 
the volatility of the cycle. Indeed, the high point of 4.01 for the mean value, reached 
in the boom of 1973, has not been exceeded since although this is partly a weighting 
issue: in 1973 the London markets had a greater weight in the mean. Nevertheless, the 
basic message is clear: the value of the estimated regulatory tax on office space 
averaged across all British office markets is an order of magnitude higher than in the 
most highly regulated sector of the most regulated market in the US. 
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It is more revealing, however, to look at the time series data for the individual markets 
reported in the Appendix Figures F1-F4 – this discussion is in terms of the central 
estimate. The most revealing point of all is the contrast between the City and West 
End of London and the role of Canary Wharf and the development of the Docklands. 
Until the early 1980s, the City office market dominated supply and the City was the 
dominant location, with a quasi-monopolistic control. It had a highly restrictive 
planning policy both in terms of height restrictions (which still endure) and historic 
designation. Even as late as in 1981, 22 conservation areas, affecting 28 percent of its 
land area were designated (Fainstein, 1994). The British property industry was 
significantly protected from international competition and supply was constrained. 
The response to the expansion in demand for office space from the 1960s was a rapid 
rise in prices reflecting both the actual limits on supply and supply restriction. The 
estimated value of the regulatory tax reached a high point in 1973, only just below a 
value of 18 (a ‘tax rate’ of 1800 percent). This fell back to just more than 5 in the 
downturn of the mid-1970s.  
 
Another difference between the City and all other office locations except London’s 
Docklands – a special case controlled by the Docklands Development Corporation set 
up in 1981 to regenerate the rundown area of the near East End abandoned by port 
activity from the 1960s – is that of the political economy of the control on planning. 
In all locations other than the City (and Docklands), voting, and so political control, 
rests with the resident adult population. As has been cogently argued by Fischel 
(2001), depending on rates of owner occupation which are high in the UK, this 
produces a pressure to restrict development to protect house owners’ asset values. 
This is likely to be re-enforced by the asymmetry of the incidence of costs and 
benefits of physical development with the costs - both short term and in terms of asset 
value losses - being very localised while benefits are thinly and widely spread. In the 
City of London, however, political control of the planning system rests with the City 
Corporation which is controlled by the local business community and its interests10. 
While these include property owners and real estate investors, the business 
community is dominated by other groups who have a mutual interest in retaining the 
City as a successful and competitive location for their businesses.  
 
As is explained by Fainstein (1994) the threat of the deregulation of financial services, 
actually introduced in 1986, concentrated the City fathers’ minds wonderfully.  
 
“….once the economic benefits of restricting growth ended, attitudes towards 
physical change easily became more flexible….Financial firms that already 
possessed space adjacent to the Bank of England benefited from their monopoly 
position and had no motivation to favour expansionary policies. Financial 
deregulation and competition changed the stakes. Competitive office development 
in the nearby Docklands threatened the interests of… the City. If the City refused 
to accommodate expansion when deregulation was prompting accelerated 
financial sector activity, firms already located there risked losing their locational 
advantage as the center of gravity moved eastwards….Once the decision to 
reverse the previous conservationist attitudes had been made, the City’s officers 
embarked on an active promotional effort. The planning director solicited advice 
                                                 
10
 This goes back to the ancient privileges of the medieval city and the leverage its tax revenues gave it 
in negotiating a high degree of independence and local control from the crown. 
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from firms concerning their space needs and encouraged developers…to 
accommodate them…until the 1980s the City did not have a planning officer but 
only an architect who concerned himself with design approvals…new developable 
land was designated…and floor area ratios were modified to…permit an average 
of 25 percent expansion in the size of buildings.” Fainstein (1994, page 40) 
 
The planning system in the City is likely, therefore, to be responsive to the interests of 
commercial tenants and threats to local competitiveness. Such threats were visible by 
the early 1980s. By the time of the property market recovery of the second half of the 
1980s, and despite the growth of the financial services sector, the City was already 
under threat from both Docklands and other financial centres (including satellite 
centres such as Reading in which more office space was constructed during the early 
1980s than in the City itself) and its planning policies were becoming notably more 
relaxed. Its Unitary Plan, lodged in 1991 (City of London, 1991), but drawn up in the 
second half of the 1980s, identified as its first policy  “To encourage office 
development in order to maintain and expand the role of the city as a leading 
international financial and business centre” (para. 3.19). By the end of the 1980s there 
were already large scale modern developments in the City, built to the highest 
international standards. Broadgate, for example, opened in 1991, provided 3 900 000 
square feet (360 000 m2) of new office space. 
 
Moreover there was a radical change to the taxation of business property introduced in 
April 1990. Before then business property taxes (the business rates) had been set by 
local governments and - subject to standard procedures for ‘rate equalisation’ across 
the country - the revenues had accrued to local communities. There was concern in the 
then conservative government that anti-business, left wing local councils were 
boosting revenues and attempting to run re-distributive local policies funded by 
setting ever higher local business rates. This, it was thought, would hinder the long 
term competitiveness of British business. So in 1990 the UBR was introduced with 
national rate-setting and with revenues accruing to central government. There was one 
exception, however, the City Corporation (self-evidently not anti-business!) was 
allowed to add its own ‘precept’ to collect its own revenues. Thus from 1990 there has 
been a strong negative fiscal incentive for any local government in Britain, except the 
City of London, to permit any commercial development. 
 
While the value of the regulatory tax in the City rose during the later 1980s as 
property values rose rapidly in the boom, it never reached the high of 1973. Indeed, in 
contrast to the rest of Britain, the regulatory tax estimate for the City has been on a 
downward trend since 1973. We can see from the evidence that is available for the 
Docklands that the regulatory regime was far less restrictive there, with an estimate of 
the regulatory tax never exceeding 4 – though that still represents a quasi-tax rate of 
400 percent. The West End, where there is political control by residents and a 
negative fiscal incentive for development, a market which specialises in sectors other 
than financial services and with much stronger planning protection for conservation 
reasons with height restrictions which are impossible to breech (unlike in the City 
where, outside the conservation areas, employing a ‘trophy architect’ has been an 
emerging mechanism for building higher) has, in contrast, experienced a steady 
increase in estimated RT with its high value of 1973 exceeded in 2000 and with an 
estimated value of 7.9 over the past six years – almost twice that in the City. 
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The pattern outside the London locations is much as would be expected. The 
estimated RT was much lower until quite recently and in Newcastle in the 1970s was 
negative for a short time. In a representative, prosperous, satellite centre such as 
Reading (discussed in more detail in Section 7), which was a major recipient of the 
back office move from London from the late 1960s, the value of the regulatory tax 
was high during the late 1970s and early 1980s but fell back somewhat as the market 
expanded. By 2000 the local market was quite specialised in hi-tech companies and 
the value of the regulatory tax fell below 2 as the dot.com boom collapsed. It has been 
creeping up since 2002/2003. The absolute value varies in provincial centres, with 
Edinburgh, Birmingham and Leeds seemingly the most restrictive. But it has been 
tending to rise in all centres since the mid 1990s and has only been consistently below 
a value of 2 in Newcastle, in the relatively depressed North East. 
 
All these numbers relate to our ‘central’ estimate but, of course, values of measures 
on alternative assumptions follow similar trends – just absolute values differ. Perhaps 
the salient fact is that even on the most conservative of all assumptions there is a 
significant estimated value for the regulatory tax in all locations for recent years. The 
lowest – Newcastle – has a value of more than 1.6 and most major provincial centres 
are around 2; London’s West End has had an estimated value of between 4 and 9 
since the early 1970s and has a current value of 8. These are estimated on the most 
conservative assumptions, so are lower bounds, and compare with a value not 
significantly different from zero for offices in Manhattan (Glaeser et al 2005).  
Moreover there may be a degree of endogeneity between construction costs and 
planning restrictiveness. In areas like the City or the West End developers may need 
an expensive design and a ‘trophy architect’ to get planning permission for buildings 
offering more rentable space per unit area of the site. In Newcastle, the local 
community may be so pleased that any developer wants to build that it is 
correspondingly easier to get permission and de facto the planning regime imposes a 
lower regulatory tax. This possible endogeneity will mean that our central estimate 
systematically tends to understate the value of the regulatory tax rather than overstate 
it, however, and this should be borne in mind in interpreting the alternative estimates 
and selecting the most plausible. 
 
6 International Comparison of Regulatory Tax Values  
 
In order to put the results for the British office markets into an international context, 
we also estimated RT values for a number of cities across Europe; Amsterdam, 
Barcelona, Brussels, Frankfurt, London City, London West End, Milan, Paris City, 
Paris La Défense and Stockholm. We use essentially the same methodology as 
described above but use different data sources (JLL instead of CBRE and Gardiner 
and Theobald instead of Davis Langdon) and have to make a number of additional 
adjustments – described in Appendix E – to compute comparable RT values. 
 
We report RT values for two office markets – the City of London and London West 
End – that are also reported in our across-UK comparison above. This ‘overlap’ 
allows us to check whether our RT estimates for British office markets and 
continental European ones are comparable. There is a relatively small difference in 
estimated RT values (average of 1999 and 2005) for the two markets; 4.5 versus 4.9 
for the City and 8.0 versus 9.0 for the West End. Overall the relatively small 
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differences suggest that our RT estimates for the various continental European 
markets are quite comparable to our RT estimates for the British office markets. 
 
When we compare our RT estimates for the various European office markets the first 
results that catches one’s eye is the fact that the two London Markets top the ‘league 
table’ with the West End’s RT estimate of 8.0 (the average of the RT estimates for 
1999 and 2005) being more than twice as large as any other continental European city 
except Frankfurt with 4.4. Stockholm and Milan also appear to have comparatively 
high RT values with 3.8 and 3.1. This is consistent with anecdotic evidence for these 
markets. For example, Milan is a very tightly regulated city with strict height 
restrictions in place. Not surprisingly, edge cities have started to develop outside 
Milan; first Milano 2 and Milano 3 in the late 1960s and 1970s and now Milano Santa 
Giulia. The latter city is being built in a municipal district in the southeast part of the 
city between Rogoredo and Linate which has been derelict for some years. The city is 
being built on the area where the Montedison factories and a part of the Redaelli steel 
mills once stood. Local politicians there – not surprisingly – are happy to welcome 
new development projects. As in London, the estimated RT values in Paris differ quite 
substantially within the metro area; they are much higher in the ‘historic’ City of Paris 
with 3.0 compared to La Défense with 1.7. Finally, the city that we had expected to 
have the lowest RT is indeed at the bottom of the ‘league table’. Belgium is well 
known to have a flexible land use regulation system which imposes little constraint on 
supply. In Brussels we estimate a commensurately low RT of 0.7, although this value 
is still much higher than that estimated by Glaeser et al (2005) for the office market of 
Manhattan.  
 
Overall, the RT comparison for the 10 European office markets suggests (a) that the 
British office market is by orders of magnitude more supply constrained by regulation 
than most other office markets in Europe and (b) that European cities generally seem 
to be subjected to higher RT values than is found in the United States. Below, we turn 
again to the British office market in an attempt to explain the determinants of its 
restrictiveness. 
 
7 Quantifying the Political Economy of Planning Restrictiveness 
 
If the estimated value of the RT really represents a measure of the costs of regulatory 
restrictiveness – we should be able to model its determinants. As noted above, in areas 
where there is control of planning policy by local residents – overwhelmingly owner 
occupiers – we should expect a strong resistance to development. Not only are there 
short run costs to local residents from large scale construction but there are likely to 
be environmental costs and losses of amenity values. Benefits – in the form of more 
jobs or higher wages – are likely to accrue as much to non-residents as to residents 
given the small size of local government areas in the UK. In addition – at least since 
the introduction of the UBR in 1990 – there will be a powerful fiscal disincentive; and 
even before 1990, the impact on local budgets of business property development was 
probably unfavourable because of the high proportion of local revenues coming from 
central government and rate equalisation across local communities. The only incentive 
for local residents to allow the development of additional commercial real estate 
would presumably be fear of falling local economic prosperity. This is likely to be 
most plausibly formulated as fear of job loss and unemployment. 
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We should expect the City of London and Docklands to behave rather differently, 
however, since in these jurisdictions business interests control planning policy.  In the 
case of the City, the planning authority is its unique local governing body, the 
Corporation of the City of London. This is an historic entity and it has been exempt 
from all the major reforms of local government in the modern era, in particular both 
from the Municipal Corporations Act of 1835 and the legislation in 1969 which 
abolished the ‘business’ vote. The City is, in effect, a Central Business District with a 
few thousand residents, so the business electorate (including land owners and property 
companies but dominated by financial and other businesses located in the City) 
controls the Corporation which is the planning authority for the area. Business voting 
power is weighted by the number of employees. The London Docklands Development 
Corporation (LDDC) was established in 1981 with the brief to regenerate the large – a 
total of 8.5 square miles - derelict port area immediately to the east of the City of 
London. The LDDC was responsible for all the major planning for the area until it 
was abolished in 1998 when planning responsibilities reverted to the local Boroughs 
of London. However, by then, the whole area had been transformed with the most 
notable development being Canary Wharf. In total 25 million square feet of office and 
industrial floor space had been developed.  
 
Given, therefore, their different controlling interests we should expect these two 
planning authorities to be less restrictive of development, other things equal11, and 
much more responsive to local economic conditions than resident-controlled planning 
authorities. For any given (change in the) level of local prosperity the business 
controlled LAs would be expected to relax their constraints on development 
substantially more than in the case of resident controlled communities. We might, 
furthermore, expect to observe a change in regulatory restrictiveness as a result of the 
introduction of the UBR in early 1990, with all other British office locations 
becoming more restrictive relative to the City of London. 
 
The best measure of ‘local economic prosperity’ would seem to be the unemployment 
rate of residents. Not only is this the most immediately observable and widely 
reported measure but the fear of job insecurity seems likely to be a concern for voters, 
and thus an influence on local politicians. It has the additional advantage that it is 
measurable12. 
 
                                                 
11
 But of course other things are not equal since the restrictions (in terms of plot ratios, for example) is 
more or less constant across locations but demand for space is not so a given restriction is more binding 
where demand is greater. This is reflected in the larger location fixed effects observed in the City 
(Table 5) than in other locations. 
12
 Although with considerably more difficulty than might be imagined. There are two basic sources of 
data on unemployment in the UK: survey based data, conforming to ILO norms, available from 1973; 
and ‘registration’ data available since the early 20th Century. The problem is that the sample for the 
survey based data is too small to give reliable results for local planning authority jurisdictions; and the 
registration measure is highly sensitive to both the incentives to register and rules governing who is 
actually counted. As unemployment rose from the late 1970s politicians could not resist manipulating 
the unemployment figures (registration data is released very quickly and is what the media focus on) by 
frequently changing both the incentive to register and the rules governing who was counted. Every one 
of the more than 100 changes had the effect of reducing measured ‘registered’ unemployment. 
However we have used the method described in Appendix G to estimate a consistent survey equivalent 
measure for each community controlling planning policy in our 14 office locations. 
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Table 5 shows the results from our first specification, pooling all 480 observations 
and including both year and location fixed effects. We estimate the following: 
 
0 1jt jt jtRT Uβ β ε= + × +   (6) 
 
( ) ( )0 1 2jt jt B jt R jtRT U D U Dβ β β ε= + × × + × × +  (7) 
 
Where: 
 
RT  =  estimated value of Regulatory Tax 
U  =  estimated British Labour Force Survey-equivalent unemployment rate 
D  =  dummies for B, business controlled, and R, resident controlled local 
 government 
j,t   refer to the location and year 
 
We show results for two separate versions of the specification stated in equation (7); 
in column 2 of Table 5 we use values of the local unemployment rate for the actual 
nearest equivalent areas for which data could be estimated. In column 3 we substitute 
the estimated unemployment rate for the whole Greater London area for the three 
office locations in central London, the City, Westminster and Docklands. The logic 
for this is that the workforces and businesses based in those locations operate over a 
wide area and draw their labour forces from the wider London region; moreover, 
particularly in the City, there are very few residents relative to employees. For the two 
suburban London office locations, Hammersmith and Croydon, we use the Borough 
unemployment rate in both models, Boroughs in London being the local planning 
authorities. More detail on how the unemployment rate time-series are created is 
given in Appendix G. 
 
The results in Table 5 show a significant negative relationship between local 
unemployment and our measure of planning restrictiveness – the Regulatory Tax. 
Moreover, as expected, the estimated value of the parameter is much larger in the 
business controlled compared to the resident controlled locations: the estimated value 
of the coefficient is more than twice as great in absolute terms in the business 
controlled locations (in both specifications reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table 5) 
and an F-test shows that these values are significantly different in statistical terms. 
The results in column 3, using unemployment in the wider London area for the City, 
West End (Westminster) and Docklands are very similar to those in column 2, using 
local unemployment rates. Most location and year fixed effects are statistically 
significant. A White-test cannot reject the null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity, hence 
we report normal standard errors. 
 
One problem with these results is that estimated values of RT become possible at 
different dates for different locations, with estimates for the first few years only being 
available for the City and the West End. That is, our sample is unbalanced. Thus the 
composition of the sample and the implicit weight of different locations within it 
changes over time. So the rest of the analysis, reported in Tables 6 to 9, is restricted to 
the 11 locations for which there is annual data on a continuous basis since 1973 (see 
Table 1 for a list of these 11 locations). Tables 6 and 7 report the results of fitting 
similar models but to this balanced sample of 363 observations, first without year 
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fixed effects and, then, in Table 7, including both location and year fixed effects. As 
might be expected the results are significantly stronger, with the difference in the 
estimated coefficients for business as compared to resident controlled locations much 
larger and statistically different (at the 1 percent level). 
 
Tables 8 and 9 now show the results of testing for the introduction of the UBR. As 
explained above, this change substantially increased the fiscal disincentive to permit 
development for all local communities except the City of London. The new basis for 
business property taxation came into force in April 1990, although it may have been 
partly anticipated. We chose the end of 1989 as the break point.13 There are two 
obvious ways to test whether this made local communities become relatively more 
restrictive than the City. We can include a dummy for all markets except the City 
from the end of 1989. The results are reported in Table 8, again, first without a 
distinction for the impact of unemployment on the value of the RT in business 
controlled as opposed to resident controlled locations, and then, in columns 2 and 3, 
adjusting for the type of local control. Compared to previous models we now include 
an additional dummy for all locations after 1989, implicitly assuming the effect of the 
change in the fiscal incentive was uniform. The model continues to perform well but 
we now observe a significant across the board increase in estimated planning 
restrictiveness in all locations compared to the City of London and compared to 
before 1990. 
 
The results reported in Table 9 permit the local response to vary across all locations. 
We see that the City appeared to become significantly less restrictive – as expected – 
while 6 out of 10 of the other locations became significantly more restrictive. For all 
other locations, except Reading, we find no significant change in RT from 1989. In 
Reading, however, we observe an apparently anomalous reduction in restrictiveness, 
significant at the 5 percent level. Reading is an unusual jurisdiction. It is about 60 kms 
to the west of London and a high speed train service opened up in 1976, with services 
taking only 22 minutes to the London terminus. This triggered its development as a 
satellite back office location producing a large demand shock relative to its then stock 
of office space. Prices and our estimate of the RT rose quickly in the second half of 
the 1970s. This expansion was initially supported by the local government. But during 
the 1980s the Trotskyite left, which strongly opposed office development, took 
political control. However, the recession of 1989-91 hit the local economy very hard 
and moderates regained control. Moreover in reaction to the perceived anti-business 
thrust of local government, the wider region within which Reading then lay – 
Berkshire in particular – teamed up with local business interests and the University to 
set up the Thames Valley Economic Partnership (TVEP) in 1991. The explicit intent 
of this was to make the local area more business friendly and to encourage business 
expansion. Perhaps it is the change in political control from radical left to moderate, 
and the lobbying activities of TVEP, which had some impact in reducing Reading’s 
planning restrictiveness from 1990. The individual coefficient is estimating the post-
1989 change in the RT. In most jurisdictions there were factors in addition to the 
introduction of the UBR that might have had an influence on planning restrictiveness 
and our estimates of RT. But in Reading it is plausible to believe that there were 
                                                 
13
 However, results do not change significantly if we choose one year earlier or one year later as break 
point. 
Research Papers in Environmental and Spatial Analysis No. 117 
 
24 
factors (other than the UBR) which both increased the measure of the RT in the pre-
1989 period and may have reduced it in the post-1989 period. 
 
Overall, however, these results seem to provide strong support for the interpretations 
offered and reinforce our confidence in the RT as a reasonable measure of the impact 
of planning restrictiveness on the costs of office space. The effects of political control 
seem to have the expected impacts as do fiscal (dis)incentives for local communities 
to permit development. Moreover, as is discussed in the conclusions, there is evidence 
that markets do get their revenge.  
 
8  Conclusions 
 
The Regulatory Tax measure of the gross costs of land use regulations for occupiers 
of property seems to be a useful one. Although it will not reflect certain forms of 
regulatory constraint, such as heavy compliance costs or costs associated with delays 
and is, therefore, a lower bound measure, the ease with which it can be estimated is a 
very substantial advantage. In this paper we provide the first estimates for commercial 
office buildings in British cities and compare these with estimates for a range of 
continental cities. Despite using different data sources the results seem to be very 
comparable. Moreover where we can get values for British locations using the 
alternative data sources again the values seem consistent. The conclusion is that 
supply in the British office market, like the British residential sector, is highly 
constrained by regulation and this costs business occupiers a substantial amount. It is, 
in effect, a tax on office users. Unless space is perfectly substitutable in production, 
therefore, there will be further costs in terms of output and employment. 
 
We argue that such a level of regulatory restriction – an order of magnitude greater 
than observed in the most restricted sector, in the most restricted markets in the US – 
is to be expected given the aims of British planning policy, the form of its 
instruments, the fragmented geographical scale of decision making (which internalises 
costs associated with development but not benefits), and the fiscal disincentive to 
local communities to allow commercial development. In this context we would expect 
differences in regulatory constraints between those authorities controlled by business 
interests compared to those controlled by residents. We are fortunate that the 
historical anomaly of the City of London – controlled by business interests since the 
middle ages and exempt from all the major reforms of local government of the 
modern age, allows us to test this proposition. We find strong evidence that business 
control makes a significant difference to the tightness of regulatory constraints on 
office building and on the reaction of restrictiveness to local economic prosperity 
measured by the unemployment rate. 
 
It is also possible to test the hypothesis that regulatory restriction responds to fiscal 
incentives and that, in particular, changes in the incentives to allow commercial 
development resulting from the introduction of the UBR early in 1990, led to even 
more restrictive land use regulation. This, again, is because the City of London was in 
large measure, protected from the change and continued to be able to levy its own rate 
on business property. Again we find strong evidence that the elimination of any fiscal 
incentive to permit commercial development was associated with an increase in the 
value of the RT outside the City of London. By further restricting the supply of office 
space costs were increased.  
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Together these findings support our confidence that the RT measure is really 
capturing – or at least closely correlated with – the gross costs imposed by land use 
regulation. 
 
One of the interesting speculations this prompts is about unintended consequences.  
As discussed above, the 1980s Conservative government perceived left wing local 
authorities as engaged in a concerted effort to frustrate its efforts to increase 
incentives, privatise state industries, sell off social housing and reduce the total tax 
take. To finance these efforts to offset the adverse and regressive impact central 
government actions were perceived as having, local government was (perceived to be) 
increasing their tax revenues from the business rate, perhaps as part of a punitive anti-
business crusade. Central government’s response was to introduce the UBR. This 
removed control of business property taxes from local communities, effectively 
turning business property taxes into a national tax. It managed, therefore, to eliminate 
all tax revenue gains to local communities from commercial real estate development 
although local governments continued to have a legal obligation to provide services to 
local businesses. So it produced a powerful fiscal disincentive for local communities 
to permit any commercial development.  
 
Over time, our results suggest, this has restricted the supply of offices and pushed up 
the value of the Regulatory Tax. The increase in business costs this represents may 
more than offset any costs that might realistically have been imposed by old-style left 
wing councils raising money from local property taxes; especially given the demise of 
old-style left wing councils that occurred between 1989 and the present.  
 
Indeed, we can quantify this effect because of the fortunate fact that the City of 
London alone was given a partial exemption from the UBR. Table 10 shows some 
indicative numbers. We choose an office of 1,500 m2 – enough to accommodate a 
medium size firm with 200 employees. In the London Borough of Camden in 2005, 
such a building had a rateable value of £112,25014 so, with the rate multiple set at 
42.6p, that meant the occupants would be paying a UBR of £47, 819 a year. If the RT 
increased in Camden to the average extent it did across the rest of the country, then 
the implied increase in its annualised cost was £76,360. Moving to a UBR, to avoid 
local communities levying extortionate taxes on business, seems likely to have 
resulted indirectly in a larger financial burden by way of the RT, than the total cost of 
business rates themselves. 
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Tables 
 
TABLE 1 
Investigated UK Office Markets and Data Availability 
 
Office Market Years with 
Available Data 
14 Market 
Sample 
(Unbalanced) 
11 Market 
Sample 
(Balanced) 
City of London 1961-2005 Yes Yes 
London West End 1961-2005 Yes Yes 
London Docklands (Canary Wharf Tower) 1998-2005 Yes No 
London Hammersmith (Inner Suburban London) 1991-2005 Yes No 
Manchester (North West) 1973-2005 Yes Yes 
Newcastle (Upon Tyne) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Croydon (Outer Suburban London) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Edinburgh (Scotland) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Glasgow (Scotland) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Maidenhead (South East) 1984-2005 Yes No 
Reading (South East) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Bristol (South West) 1973-2005 Yes Yes 
Birmingham (West Midlands) 1965-2005 Yes Yes 
Leeds (Yorkshire and Humberside) 1973-2005 Yes Yes 
 
 
TABLE 2 
Summary Statistics: Regulatory Tax relative to Marginal Construction Cost 
 
Variable: Ratio: Regulatory Tax / MCC Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Specification:      
 Based on prime rent (no adjustment) 480 3.70 2.92 0.13 22.06 
 Prime rent partially adjusted for rent-free 
periods 480 3.03 2.66 -0.05 19.81 
 Prime rent fully adjusted for rent-free periods 
and vacancy rates (central estimate) 480 2.64 2.37 -0.14 17.55 
 Upper bound: Assume 10% premium for top 
floor plus 50% of fully adjusted total 
occupation cost markup 
480 3.88 3.10 0.15 23.95 
 Based on fully adjusted prime rent plus 10% 
premium for top floor 480 3.01 2.60 -0.05 19.41 
 Lower bound: As central estimate but assume 
0.5 percentage point higher yield 480 2.37 2.15 -0.18 15.78 
Data Sources: CBRE (prime rent, yield and total occupation cost information), Davis Langdon (marginal 
construction cost information), IPD (national void rate index) and ODPM (regional vacancy rates). 
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TABLE 3 
Summary Statistics: Relative Regulatory Tax over Time (1961-2005) 
 (Central Estimate) 
 
Year Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1961 2 2.93 0.33 2.70 3.16 
1962 2 3.07 0.12 2.98 3.15 
1963 2 3.13 0.24 2.96 3.31 
1964 2 2.99 0.20 2.85 3.13 
1965 8 1.68 1.04 0.42 2.96 
1966 8 1.85 1.13 0.53 3.37 
1967 8 2.02 1.24 0.64 3.83 
1968 8 2.36 1.63 0.73 4.97 
1969 8 2.69 2.33 0.71 7.27 
1970 8 2.69 3.22 0.39 9.98 
1971 8 2.88 3.42 0.37 9.99 
1972 8 2.58 3.36 0.20 9.63 
1973 11 4.01 5.08 0.62 17.55 
1974 11 2.86 4.49 0.00 15.57 
1975 11 1.87 1.81 0.14 6.37 
1976 11 2.43 1.53 0.80 5.36 
1977 11 2.86 2.29 1.06 7.38 
1978 11 3.00 2.30 1.14 7.65 
1979 11 3.13 2.64 1.12 8.70 
1980 11 2.06 2.24 0.27 7.12 
1981 11 2.42 2.42 0.34 8.08 
1982 11 2.34 2.45 0.36 8.51 
1983 11 2.16 2.37 0.16 8.13 
1984 12 2.08 2.19 -0.07 7.85 
1985 12 2.18 2.32 -0.07 8.13 
1986 12 2.20 2.54 -0.11 8.90 
1987 12 2.61 3.79 -0.12 13.35 
1988 12 2.73 3.66 -0.14 11.79 
1989 12 3.10 3.36 0.20 11.36 
1990 12 2.95 2.88 0.42 9.27 
1991 13 2.61 1.97 0.60 7.61 
1992 13 2.24 1.32 0.54 5.46 
1993 13 1.91 1.03 0.46 4.60 
1994 13 2.63 1.35 0.78 6.02 
1995 13 2.96 1.65 0.99 7.13 
1996 13 3.24 1.91 1.12 7.99 
1997 13 3.30 2.14 1.10 8.46 
1998 14 3.23 2.15 1.02 8.58 
1999 14 3.21 2.16 1.06 9.18 
2000 14 3.45 2.41 1.10 10.22 
2001 14 3.09 2.17 0.86 8.73 
2002 14 2.56 1.64 0.81 6.90 
2003 14 2.07 1.26 0.63 5.69 
2004 14 2.17 1.53 0.67 7.05 
2005 14 2.63 1.91 0.99 8.89 
 
Research Papers in Environmental and Spatial Analysis No. 117 
 
30 
TABLE 4 
Estimates of Regulatory Tax for Selected European Cities 
 
 Estimated Regulatory Tax 
City 1999 2005 Average 
London West End 7.62 8.37 8.00 
London City 4.68 4.31 4.49 
Frankfurt 5.44 3.31 4.37 
Stockholm 4.28 3.30 3.79 
Milan 2.07 4.11 3.09 
Paris: City 2.35 3.75 3.05 
Barcelona 2.23 3.16 2.69 
Amsterdam 2.12 1.92 2.02 
Paris: La Defense 1.41 1.93 1.67 
Brussels 0.52 0.84 0.68 
Notes: Estimates are based on data provided by Jones Lang LaSalle (JLL) Investment Management 
(capital value data) and Gardiner and Theobald (construction cost data). The data from JLL are 
hypothetical capital values based on mid-point yields and prime rent information. The provided values 
assume that buildings are permanently renewed (so called Peter-Pan buildings). We adjusted the value 
by a scaling factor to predict actual capital values. The scaling factor is derived by using prime rent, 
prime yield, vacancy rate and rent-free period information from CBRE. The computation method for the 
scaling factor is described in more detail in Appendix E. The estimated scaling factor is 0.697. That is, 
actual capital value = 0.697 * capital value based on the assumption that the building is permanently 
renewed and ignoring rent-free periods and vacancy rates. The average construction cost estimates from 
Gardiner and Theobald are adjusted by another scaling factor to get marginal construction costs. The 
scaling factor is derived by using marginal construction cost information from Davis Langdon. The 
estimated scaling factor is 0.827. That is, the marginal construction cost of an additional hypothetical 
floor (excluding fixed cost) = 0.827 * average construction cost (including fixed cost). The computation 
method for the scaling factor is described in more detail Appendix E. 
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TABLE 5 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Unbalanced Sample with Year Fixed Effects 
(Fixed Effects Model, 1961-2005, all Locations) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) 
-14.989   Unemployment rate in local 
office market (3.599)***   
 -29.646  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* business controlled (bB1)  (5.274)***  
 -12.392  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* resident controlled (bR1)  (3.612)***  
  -29.223 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* business controlled (bB2)   (5.301)*** 
  -12.121 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* resident controlled (bR2)   (3.752)*** 
6.407 7.520 7.516 City of London (0.267)*** (0.396)*** (0.399)*** 
5.500 5.596 5.601 London West End (0.267)*** (0.264)*** (0.265)*** 
2.561 3.928 3.931 London Docklands (Canary 
Wharf) (0.467)*** (0.586)*** (0.587)*** 
1.523 1.451 1.548 London Hammersmith (Inner 
Suburban London) (0.362)*** (0.357)*** (0.360)*** 
0.504 0.537 0.547 Manchester (North West) (0.289)* (0.284)* (0.285)* 
0.326 0.380 0.235 Croydon (Outer Suburban 
London) (0.269) (0.266) (0.284) 
1.086 1.158 1.166 Edinburgh (Scotland) (0.278)*** (0.274)*** (0.276)*** 
0.960 0.953 0.952 Glasgow (Scotland) (0.259)*** (0.255)*** (0.256)*** 
1.138 1.242 1.267 Maidenhead (South East) (0.386)*** (0.381)*** (0.385)*** 
1.332 1.464 1.477 Reading (South East) (0.317)*** (0.314)*** (0.319)*** 
0.151 0.224 0.239 Bristol (South West) (0.310) (0.306) (0.308) 
1.062 1.088 1.091 Birmingham (West Midlands) (0.262)*** (0.258)*** (0.258)*** 
0.513 0.566 0.579 Leeds (Yorkshire and 
Humberside) (0.298)* (0.294)* (0.296)* 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
-2.922 -3.485 -3.488 Constant (0.865)*** (0.865)*** (0.867)*** 
Observations 480 480 480 
Number of locations (unbalanced) 14 14 14 
R-squared: within 0.32 0.34 0.34 
 between 0.081 0.32 0.33 
 overall 0.033 0.0014 0.0020 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. F-
tests reject null-hypotheses bB1=bR1 and bB2=bR2 with 99 percent confidence. White-tests cannot reject the 
null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
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TABLE 6 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Balanced Sample without Year Fixed Effects 
(Fixed Effects Model, 1973-2005, 11 markets) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) 
-8.828   Unemployment rate in local 
office market (1.957)***   
 -44.691  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* business controlled (bB1)  (6.153)***  
 -5.209  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* resident controlled (bR1)  (1.954)***  
  -44.691 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* business controlled (bB2)   (6.154)*** 
  -5.286 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* resident controlled (bR2)   (1.990)*** 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No 
3.327 3.335 3.333 Constant 
(0.159)*** (0.151)*** (0.151)*** 
Observations 363 363 363 
Number of locations (balanced) 11 11 11 
R-squared: within 0.055 0.15 0.15 
 between 0.0040 0.48 0.48 
 overall 0.017 0.19 0.19 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. F-
tests reject null-hypotheses bB1=bR1 and bB2=bR2 with 99 percent confidence. White-tests cannot reject the 
null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
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TABLE 7 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Balanced Sample with Year Fixed Effects 
(Fixed Effects Model, 1973-2005, 11 markets) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (1) 
-16.980   Unemployment rate in local 
office market (3.997)***   
 -53.896  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* business controlled (bB1)  (6.596)***  
 -11.289  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* resident controlled (bR1)  (3.834)***  
  -53.610 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* business controlled (bB2)   (6.611)*** 
  -11.196 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* resident controlled (bR2)   (3.994)*** 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
4.384 4.303 4.299 Constant 
(0.376)*** (0.352)*** (0.353)*** 
Observations 363 363 363 
Number of locations (balanced) 11 11 11 
R-squared: within 0.20 0.30 0.30 
 between 0.0040 0.45 0.46 
 overall 0.052 0.095 0.099 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. F-
tests reject null-hypotheses bB1=bR1 and bB2=bR2 with 99 percent confidence. White-tests cannot reject the 
null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
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TABLE 8 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Balanced Sample with Post 1989 Dummy  
(Fixed Effects Model, 1973-2005, 11 markets) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) 
-8.654   Unemployment rate in local 
office market (1.901)***   
 -44.691  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* business controlled (bB1)  (5.951)***  
 -5.017  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* resident controlled (bR1)  (1.891)***  
  -44.691 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* business controlled (bB2)   (5.956)*** 
  -4.930 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* resident controlled (bR2)   (1.928)** 
0.635 0.640 0.634 Dummy variable: Post 1989, all 
markets except City of London (0.135)*** (0.128)*** (0.128)*** 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No 
3.034 3.041 3.030 Constant 
(0.166)*** (0.158)*** (0.158)*** 
Observations 363 363 363 
Number of locations (balanced) 11 11 11 
R-squared: within 0.11 0.20 0.20 
 between 0.095 0.48 0.49 
 overall 0.0030 0.16 0.16 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. F-
tests reject null-hypotheses bB1=bR1 and bB2=bR2 with 99 percent confidence. White-tests cannot reject the 
null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
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TABLE 9 
Explaining the Regulatory Tax—Location Specific Post 1989 Dummies  
(Fixed Effects Model, 1973-2005, balanced sample, 11 markets) 
 
 Dependent Variable: Regulatory Tax 
Explanatory Variable (1) (2) (3) 
-5.936   Unemployment rate in local 
office market (1.738)***   
 -13.497  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* business controlled (bB1)  (6.728)**  
 -5.396  Unemployment rate (measure 1) 
* resident controlled (bR1)  (1.798)***  
  -13.497 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* business controlled (bB2)   (6.727)** 
  -5.478 Unemployment rate (measure 2) 
* resident controlled (bR2)   (1.817)*** 
-3.774 -3.461 -3.461 City of London * Post 1989 (0.368)*** (0.456)*** (0.456)*** 
1.739 1.717 1.720 
London West End * Post 1989 (0.368)*** (0.369)*** (0.369)*** 
1.354 1.360 1.359 
Manchester * Post 1989 (0.362)*** (0.362)*** (0.362)*** 
0.334 0.351 0.348 
Newcastle * Post 1989 (0.365) (0.365) (0.365) 
-0.103 -0.126 -0.182 Croydon * Post 1989 (0.368) (0.369) (0.365) 
0.991 0.999 0.998 
Edinburgh * Post 1989 (0.362)*** (0.362)*** (0.362)*** 
0.382 0.393 0.391 Glasgow * Post 1989 (0.363) (0.363) (0.363) 
-0.877 -0.874 -0.874 
Reading * Post 1989 (0.361)** (0.361)** (0.361)** 
0.615 0.617 0.617 
Bristol * Post 1989 (0.361)* (0.361)* (0.361)* 
1.151 1.153 1.152 
Birmingham * Post 1989 (0.361)*** (0.361)*** (0.361)*** 
0.796 0.800 0.799 
Leeds * Post 1989 (0.361)** (0.361)** (0.361)** 
Location Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects No No No 
Constant 2.998 3.001 3.001 
 (0.147)*** (0.147)*** (0.147)*** 
Observations 363 363 363 
Number of locations (balanced) 11 11 11 
R-squared: within 0.38 0.38 0.38 
 between 0.22 0.27 0.28 
 overall 0.0016 0.012 0.013 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. F-
tests reject null-hypotheses bB1=bR1 and bB2=bR2 with 75 percent confidence. White-tests cannot reject the 
null-hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
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TABLE 10 
Quantitative Effect of Introduction of Uniform Business Rate in 1990  
on a Medium Size Office Firm with 1500m2 Space Usage  
 
 Change in Annual Occupation Cost 
Office Market in 1989 £ in 2005 £ 
London West End 58928 89097 
Manchester 47911 72440 
Newcastle 56074 84783 
Croydon 61854 93522 
Edinburgh 35982 54404 
Glasgow 37572 56808 
Reading 46544 70374 
Bristol 44848 67809 
Birmingham 41078 62109 
Leeds 41360 62535 
Average (all markets) 50503 76360 
Notes: A floor plan of 1500 m2 is typically considered sufficient for up to 200 
employees. The values are calculated by using the coefficient on the dummy 
variable ‘Post 1989, all markets except City of London’ reported in Table 8. 
Market specific estimated regulatory tax rates and marginal construction cost 
estimates from Davis Langdon are used for 1989 to compute the capitalized value 
of the effect of the introduction of the Uniform Business Rate in 1990. Market 
specific yields from CBRE for 1989 are used to compute annualised values. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix A: Detailed Description of Methodology to Derive 
Marginal Construction Cost 
 
We obtained construction cost data from Davis Langdon. The time-series data 
contains information for all 14 prime office markets and for time periods between 
1961 and 2005. The marginal construction costs are derived from a number of past 
development projects in each of the last five decades (including the 2000s). These 
projects include a number of London and non-London urban office buildings. The 
office development projects in London include: P&O, Euston Square (in the 1960s 
and 1970s), New Bridge St., Appold St. (in the 1980s) and 60 Queen Victoria, 
Greycoat, Premier Place, 140 Aldersgate, 280 Bishopsgate (in the 1990s and 2000s). 
In addition to these projects, Davis Langdon used their ‘1994 Cost Model’ and their 
‘2004 Cost Model’ to derive marginal construction cost for the period 1990 to 2005 as 
appropriately as possible. The non-London urban development projects include office 
buildings in Hampshire, Cheshunt, Croydon, Manchester, Birmingham (2 projects) (in 
the 1960s), Oxford, Bracknell, Halesowen, Warrington, Romford (in the 1970s), 
Hemel Hempstead and Manchester (in the 1980s) and Cardiff, Harlow and Egham (in 
the 1990s).15 
 The marginal construction costs (per square meter of office space) were 
calculated for a hypothetical additional top floor on those buildings using standard 
industry value assumptions. The cost elements are listed in Appendix Table A-1 
below. 
 
Appendix Table A-1: Cost Elements 
1 Substucture 3C Ceiling Finishes 5L Communication Installations 
Superstructure 4 F&F Services 5M Special Installations 
2A Frame 5A Sanitary Appliances 5N BWIC 
2B Upper Floors 5B Services Equipment 5O Builders Profit 
2C Roof 5C Disposal Installations External Works 
2D Stairs 5D Water Installations 6A Site Works 
2E External Walls 5E Heat Source 6B Drainage 
2F External Windows & Doors 5F Space Heating 6C External Services 
2G Internal Walls 5G Ventilating Systems 6D External Works 
2H Internal Doors 5H Electrical Installations 7 Prelims 
Internal Finishes 5I Gas Installations 8 Contingencies 
3A Wall Finishes 5J Lift Installation 
 
3B Floor Finishes 5K Protective Installation  
 
Based on the above information, Davis Langdon produced various estimating 
models for (a) London office buildings and (b) non-London office buildings and for 
the various time periods (i.e., (a1) 1960s and 1970s, (a2) 1980s, (a3) 1990s and 2000s; 
                                                 
15
  We also obtained marginal construction cost data from Davis Langdon for a number of business 
park projects. These projects include: Imperium, Newbury, Wandsworth, Plympton, Plymouth, 
Powergen, Addison (in the early 1990s) and Oxford, Solent, Admirals Park, B1 Block, RSPCA, 
Solihull (in the late 1990s). To date we have not used this information in our empirical analysis. 
However, we may use the data in a subsequent analysis to investigate to what extent construction 
costs themselves may be influenced by regulation and may further increase our estimates of the 
‘regulatory tax’. 
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(b1) 1960s, (b2) 1970s, (b3) 1980s and (b4) 1990s). Since there was no estimating 
model available for non-London office buildings for the years between 2000 and 
2005, we used the model for the 1990s.  
Finally, the annual construction cost numbers can be derived by using the above 
estimating models and applying Davis Langdon’s total building cost location factors 
(for each of the 14 markets; with outer London having a factor of 1) as well as tender 
price indices between 1961 and 2005. It should be noted that the location factors were 
only available for 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. No location factors 
were available prior to 1975, however, the location factors vary relatively little over 
time and hence the location factors for 1975 are used for years prior to 1975. For 
years with missing location factor information, linear trends are assumed. 
 
 
Appendix B:  Imputing Missing Values for Rent-Free Periods 
 
We obtained rent-free period data from CBRE for two markets (the City of 
London and London’s West End) for the years 1993 to 2006. For the remaining years 
and for the other markets we needed to impute the variable.  
A first plot of the data reveals that the rent-free periods at any point in time are 
not only surprisingly different between the City of London and the West End but their 
dynamic and their correlation with trends in rents also differ considerably. The 
negative correlation between the deviation of the observed rent from the trend on the 
one hand and the rent-free period on the other hand is extremely strong and 
statistically highly significant for the City (-0.87) but quite low and not statistically 
significant for the West End (-0.05).16 These stylized facts are consistent with our 
observation that the City office market specializes in the financial service sector, 
which is strongly exposed to general market developments, while the West End 
specialises in sectors that are more protected from general market trends (e.g. the 
media, business and legal services) or that may even have anti-cyclical demand for 
office space (e.g. lobbyists).  
We acknowledge this difference between the two markets and impute the rent-
free periods for the missing years of those two markets using two different estimating 
equations. The rent-free periods in the City of London for years with missing 
observations are estimated as follows: 
 
( )t 0 1 tRent Free Period  = Deviation Trend-Rentβ β ε+ × +   (A1) 
 
The adjusted R2 is 0.73. 
In order to estimate rent-free periods in the West End we estimate a different 
equation that provides a better fit than equation (A1). The estimating equation is as 
follows: 
 
( )t 0 1 tRent Free Period  = Annual Growth in Rentβ β ε+ × +   (A2) 
 
                                                 
16
  The idea here is that if demand for office space is high (markets are overheating and rents are above 
the long-term growth path), tenant incentives such as rent-free periods will be quite low. On the 
other hand, if demand for office space is low (markets are in a declining or bust phase and rents are 
therefore below trend) then developers will tend to offer generous incentives (high rent free 
periods) to attract tenants. 
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The adjusted R2 is merely .087 but within-sample predictions are all in a 
reasonably narrow band of +/- 5 months, with the majority of predictions being within 
a band of +/- 2 months. 
Finally, for the remaining 12 markets without any rent-free period data we use the 
following equation that is estimated using all available observations with rent-free 
periods (i.e., the City and the West End): 
 
( )jt 0 1 jtRent Free Period  = Deviation Trend-Rent
Dummy West End Year Dummies
β β
ε
+ ×
+ + +
 (A3) 
The adjusted R2 is 0.22. Within sample predictions (for the City and West End) 
suggest that the estimated values may be reasonably good approximations of observed 
rent-free periods. 
The existing imputation method for rent-free periods is merely a first attempt to 
reliable estimate rent-free periods and is subject to further enhancement. However, as 
a further sensitivity analysis reveals, our results are quite robust towards measurement 
errors in rent-free periods. Even if we assume the maximum rent-free period ever 
observed in the City and in the West End (2.8 years) we still end up with substantial 
estimated values of the regulatory tax as a percent of marginal construction costs. 
 
Appendix C: Imputing Missing Values for Vacancy Rates 
 
We obtained vacancy rate data for relatively short time-series (from 1999 to 
2004) for various U.K. regions (East Midlands, East of England, London, North East, 
North West, South, East, South West, West Midland, Yorkshire & the Humberside) 
from the ODPM. We first geographically match our 14 local markets to those regions. 
Next we use national void-rent data from IPD (from 1994 to 2004) to impute vacancy 
rates back until 1994 by assuming that regional vacancy rates moved with the national 
trend between 1994 and 1998. We then impute the vacancy rates for remaining 
missing observations using the following estimating equation for all 14 markets: 
 
( )jt 0 1 jtVacancy rate  = Deviation Trend-Rent
Location Dummies Year Dummies
β β
ε
+ ×
+ + +
 (A4) 
The adjusted R2 is 0.82. For more than 80 percent of the in-sample observations, 
the measurement error lies well within +/- 1 percentage point; the maximum error is 
roughly +/- 2 percent points. 
 
 
Appendix D: Imputing Missing Values for Yields  
 
Finally, we also attempted to impute equivalent yields for years prior to 1973. We 
obtained equivalent yield data from CBRE for all our 14 markets, typically from 1973 
until 2005. Similarly to the above imputation method, we estimate the equivalent 
yields as a function of the deviation of rents from the trend, location and year fixed 
effects. The R2 is 0.62. The predicted values imply that yields were higher in the 
1960s and decreased notably around 1973 but this may be a result of a misspecified 
estimating equation. Hence, we are, at this point at least, very cautious interpreting 
results prior to 1973. In future research we intend to either collect information on 
prices of office space (should such data be available) or to collect information on 
property yields prior to 1972 (we obtained yield information for 1972 from Hillier 
Research Papers in Environmental and Spatial Analysis No. 117 
 
40 
Parker’s ‘Investors Chronicle – Hillier Parker Rent Index’), or, should that not be 
feasible, to improve our preliminary method for imputing equivalent yields. One 
promising direction is to include interest rates and perhaps other macro-variables as 
further explanatory variables in addition to the deviation of rents from the trend and 
location dummies. We also intend to experiment with lagged explanatory variables 
and to do some more elaborate in-sample and out-of-sample testing. For now, 
however, our results prior to 1973 have to be interpreted with considerable caution, 
especially since variations in yields are more influential drivers of regulatory tax 
estimates than are plausible variations in rent free periods or voids. 
 
Appendix E: Methodology Used to Compute Regulatory Tax Values 
for Continental European Cities 
 
We use prime annual rent data and mid-point yield data from JLL for 10 office 
locations across Europe (including the City of London and London West End) to 
compute the ‘hypothetical’ capital value per m2 of a so called ‘Peter Pan building’, 
that is, a building that is constantly renewed. We adjust the value by a scaling factor 
1θ  that is derived as follows: 
 
,6 2005
,
1 1999
1 0.6796 7
CBRE central
jt
JLL Peter Pan
j t jt
V
V
θ = == =
×
∑ ∑
 (E1) 
 
where ,JLL Peter-PanjtV  is the hypothetical capital value per m
2
 of a ‘Peter Pan building’ in 
office market j in year t based on data from JLL and where ,CBRE centraljtV  is the estimated 
actual value of a prime office building in market j in year t based on data from CBRE 
(adjusting for rent-free periods and vacancy rates). The office markets include the 
City of London, London West End, Birmingham, Edinburgh, Leeds and Manchester. 
These are all the markets for which we have overlapping data from CBRE and JLL.  
 
The hypothetical actual property value ,JLL actualjtV  for market j in year t based on JLL 
data can be calculated as follows: 
 
, ,
1
JLL actual JLL Peter Pan
jt jtV Vθ= × . (E2) 
 
 
We use average construction cost data from Gardiner and Theobald’s (2006) 
publication ‘International Construction Cost Survey’. We use another scaling factor 
2θ  to get from average to marginal construction cost. The scaling factor is computed 
as follows: 
 
2 2005
1 1999
2 0.8272 7
DL
jt
GT
j t jt
MCC
ACC
θ = == =
×
∑ ∑
 (E3) 
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where DLjtMCC  is the marginal construction cost per m
2 provided by Davis Langdon 
per m2 (for market j and year t) and where GTjtACC is the average construction cost per 
m
2 provided by Gardiner and Theobald (2006). The value GTjtACC  is the average of a 
low and a high estimate of average construction costs in a city centre air conditioned 
office building. The office markets that are used to calculate the adjustment factor 2θ  
are the City of London and London West End; this is because Gardiner and Theobald’ 
survey only provides construction cost data for London but not for the other UK 
office markets. 
 
The hypothetical marginal construction cost GTjtMCC  for market j in year t based on 
Gardiner and Theobald data can be calculated as follows: 
 
2
GT GT
jt jtMCC ACCθ= × . (E4) 
 
 
Appendix F: Regulatory Tax Estimates for 14 British Office 
Markets over Time 
 
Figures G1-G4 illustrate our estimated regulatory tax rates for our 14 British office 
markets over time. The four figures combine markets with relative geographical 
proximity (i.e., London office markets, South East office markets, Midlands and 
North office markets, and Scottish office markets). Note that the RT scales (y-axis) of 
the four figures are different, reflecting the regional differences in the magnitude of 
RT. 
Figure F1: Regulatory Tax (Central Estimate)
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Figure F2: Regulatory Tax (Central Estimate)
South East Office Markets
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Figure F3: Regulatory Tax (Central Estimate)
Midlands and North Office Markets
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Figure F4: Regulatory Tax (Central Estimate)
Scottish Office Markets
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Appendix G: Data Sources and Methodology Used to Calculate 
Unemployment Rate Time-Series 
 
We use unemployment data from three major sources; Eurostat, Labour Gazette and 
Nomis. We describe the precise data sources and the methodology used to compute 
comparable unemployment rate time-series over time below.  
 
(1) Data Sources 
 
(a) Eurostat 
 
Eurostat United Kingdom regional data for Southeast, Southwest, North/Northeast, 
Northwest, West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside, and Scotland between 1973-
1996 collected from “Regional Statistics” 1973, 1975, 1977, 1979; continued by 
“Yearbook of Regional Statistics” 1983, 1984, 1985; continued by “Regions: 
Statistical Yearbook” 1986-1997. All three published by the office for official 
publications of the European communities, Luxembourg. 1999-2004 collected from 
the Eurostat homepage; http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
 
(b) Labour Gazette 
 
Unemployment rates for the regions of Southeast, Southwest, North/Northeast, 
Northwest, West Midlands, Yorkshire and Humberside, Scotland, and local authority 
areas of Birmingham, Leeds, Bristol, Manchester, Reading, Greater London, 
Edinburgh, Glasgow, Newcastle upon Tyne, Tyneside, North Tyneside, South 
Tyneside, Slough and Berkshire between 1960-2005 collected from “Labour Gazette” 
1960-1967; continued by “Employment and Productivity Gazette” 1968-1970; 
continued by “Department of Employment Gazette” 1971-1978; continued by 
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“Employment Gazette” 1979-1995; continued by “Labour Market Trends” 1996-
2005. All five published by the Office for National Statistics. 
 
All data was collected monthly and the arithmetic average was taken to produce 
annual estimates. Where data was missing due to government employee action, etc, 
missing months were estimated by linearising the difference between the nearest 
existing values. 
 
Greater London 
 
Data on Greater London unemployment rates does not begin until March 1960, 
however unemployment counts are published for January and February. Because the 
Labour Gazette uses the same normalizing count for each month of the same year, this 
statistic was estimated given the counts and rates of unemployment between March 
and December by dividing unemployment counts by unemployment rates. The 
resulting statistic was averaged over the 10 months, and unemployment counts for 
January and February were divided by it to produce rates. 
 
Newcastle upon Tyne 
 
Data for Newcastle upon Tyne was collected from the Tyneside area between January 
1962 and May 1978, then from North and South Tyneside from June 1978 to July 
1984, and finally from Newcastle upon Tyne from August 1984 to December 2005. 
 
In order to try and reconcile these differing areas, claimant counts for North and South 
Tyneside were divided by unemployment rates to estimate the normalizing statistic 
used for each area like January and February 1960 for Greater London. These 
statistics were then summed to produce a pseudo-North and South Tyneside 
normalizing statistic, and then the sum of claimant counts for both North and South 
were divided by the pseudo-North and South normalizing statistic to reconstruct a rate 
of unemployment for both North and South Tyneside.  
 
At the May/June 1978 and July/August 1984 structural breaks the data was reconciled 
by assuming that the ratio between the data on each side of the structural break 
remained constant backwards in time, and these ratios was used to back-calculate all 
data sets from Newcastle upon Tyne from August 1984. For example; 
 
_1984 _(Pr _ _1984)
_(Pr _ _1984)
_1984&
August i e August
i e AugustJuly
Newcastle upon Tyne Hypothetical Newcastle Upon Tyne
North  South Tyneside North and  South Tyneside=
  (G1) 
and, 
July_1978 i_(Pre_July_1978)
June_1978 i_(Pre_July_1978
=
Hypothetical-Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Hypothetical Newcastle upon Tyne
Tyneside Tyneside
   (G2) 
 
Maidenhead 
 
Data for Maidenhead comes from local area unemployment from Slough between 
January 1981 and August 1984, and then Berkshire between September 1984 to 
December 2005. 
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The data between these two regions is reconciled at the structural breaks in the same 
manner as Newcastle upon Tyne, producing a hypothetical Berkshire between January 
1981 and August 1984. 
 
(c) Nomis Official Labour Market Statistics 
 
All 33 London local area unemployment rates including London West End, City of 
London, London Docklands, Hammersmith & Fulham, and Croydon local authority 
area unemployment rates between 1996-2005 were collected from 
www.nomisweb.co.uk. 
 
(2) Methodology Used to Compute Hypothetical Eurostat Unemployment 
Rates for Local Areas back to 1960 
 
(a) Regions 
 
Prior to 1973, as well as 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980-1982, and 1989 we have no data on 
Eurostat regional unemployment. In order to estimate this data the ratios between all 
Eurostat and Labour Gazette regions are calculated for the existing Eurostat years. For 
the years in which the Eurostat data does not exist, the annual Eurostat/Labour 
Gazette ratios on both sides of the missing years are linearised and then multiplied by 
the Labour Gazette region for the missing year(s) to estimate the missing Eurostat 
values. For example in the case of a one year gap; 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
/ 2i it t t
i it t t
Hypothetical Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat Eurostat
Gazette Gazette Gazette Gazette
− + −
− + −
  
= + −      
  (G3) 
 
For region i and time t. 
 
For years prior to 1973, the 1973 Eurostat/Labour Gazette ratio is used to estimate 
hypothetical annual Eurostat values from Labour Gazette unemployment rates for 
each year. 
 
(b) Local Areas 
 
Hypothetical Eurostat local area (not including Intra-London areas, see below) and 
Greater London unemployment rates between 1960 and 2005 were estimated by 
assuming that the ratio between Eurostat regional and Labour Gazette regional 
unemployment for each year was identical to the ratio between the hypothesized 
Eurostat and Labour Gazette local area rates, as shown below. 
 
it at
it at
=
Hypothetical EurostatEurostat
Gazette Gazette
 (G4) 
 
For local area a and the corresponding region i at time t. Where the corresponding 
region represents the region inclusive of the local area in question (ex. Scotland for 
Glasgow, Southeast for Reading, etc). 
 
(c) Intra-London areas 
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Neither Eurostat nor the Labour Gazette produce local area unemployment rates for 
the City of London, London West End, London Docklands, Hammersmith & Fulham, 
or Croydon (intra-London) and so hypothetical Eurostat unemployment rates for all 
intra-London areas were estimated using corresponding rates from Nomis as follows. 
 
First a hypothetical Eurostat London unemployment rate was calculated for the years 
1996-2005 using Eurostat and Gazette Southeast regional and Greater London data as 
shown below. 
 
t
tt
t
×Eurostat SEHypothetical Eurostat London Gazette LondonGazette SE
=
 (G5) 
 
Then, a hypothetical Nomis Greater London was constructed using estimates of 
working age population (see below) as follows. 
 
n
at
n atat
a=1
at
a=1
= ×
populationHypothetical Nomis London Nomis
population
 
 
 
 
  
∑
∑
 (G6) 
 
Then, taking these two hypothetical rates a hypothetical Eurostat rate for all intra-
London areas was estimated as follows. 
 
LondonNomisalHypothetic
LondonEurostatalHypothetic
NomisEurostatalHypothetic
t
t
atat
__
__
_
×=
 (G7) 
 
 Intra-London unemployment rates prior to 1996 were back-calculated assuming the 
1996 ratio between the local area and Greater London unemployment rates remained 
constant until 1960 as follows. 
 
at
a1996
t
1996
=
×
Hypothetical Eurostat
Hypothetical EurostatHypothetical Eurostat London Hypothetical Eurostat London
 (G8) 
 
 
